Volume 40
Issue 4 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 40,
1935-1936
5-1-1936

The Contribution of Chief Justice John W. Kephart to the Law
Ruby R. Vale

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Ruby R. Vale, The Contribution of Chief Justice John W. Kephart to the Law, 40 DICK. L. REV. 205 (1936).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol40/iss4/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

Dickinson Law Review
VOLUME XL

MAY, 1936

NUMBER

4

THE CONTRIBUTION OF CHIEF JUSTICE
JOHN W. KEPHART TO THE LAW*
RUBY R. VALE*
It has been a great satisfaction for over twenty years to follow the judicial
service of a schoolmate. That pleasure has turned to personal pride with the passing years and the attendant excellence of his work as his labors lengthened. I regard myself as fortunate to be privileged in the presence of his fellow Dickinsonians
to say a few words in appreciation of the unusual length and exceptional nature
of his work as an Appellate Judge.
Time will not permit and others better can tell of the inspiring lesson to the
motherhood and youth of America of the devotion of a widowed mother, of the
early aspirations and undaunted efforts of her four worthy sons and particularly
of the present Chief Justice of this Commonwealth.
A sentence must give his career as lawyer as prefatory to an outline of his contribution to the law. He was graduated from Dickinson Law School in 1894,
admitted to the bar the year following, became a Judge of the Superior Court in
1914, a Justice of the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in
1919 and its Chief Justice in 1936. So that at the end of his term his total service
will exceed that of any prior Appellate Judge, the next being Chief Justice Gibson,
also an alumnus of Dickinson, with a total of twenty-four years and his will be
twenty-six years.
It is not easy to summarize even in barest outline a judicial service of such
length; so bear with me.
Chief Justice Kephart has written over a thousand opinions including dissenting and concurring, of which approximately eight hundred have been written as an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. An indication of the character of a judge's
*A. B. Dickinson College, 1894; LL. B., Dickinson School of Law, 1899; Member of the bar
of Philadelphia County, offices, 1542-3-4 Land Title Building, Philadelphia, Pa.

**An address delivered at a dinner tendered Chief Justice Kephart by the Alumni of Dickinson
College.
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work may be gathered from a study of his dissents and those of his associates from
his opinions. He is not a dissentient judge, having written only about forty-five
dissenting opinions, in one-half of which he has been supported by other members of the court. There have been less than twenty-five dissents filed against
the opinions of the court which he wrote and in a few instances only are such
dissents written and concurred in by other judges.
It is a remarkable fact that two of his dissenting opinions have been sustained
by the Supreme Court of the United States.
In Reed v. Director General of Railroads,' without filing any opinion he
dissented from the majority opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania which
held that an employee under the Federal Employers' Liability Act assumed all the
ordinary risk of his employment. The Supreme Court of the United States in an
opinion by Mr. Justice McReynolds adopted the view of the then Justice Kephart,
2
who denied the assumption of such risk.
The courts of England and America have made several historic decisions
of vital moment in the reconciliation of the rights of the individual in the
eternal conflict between the individual and his group. One of the last of such
decisions was by the Supreme Court of the United States in Mahon v. Pa. Coal Co.3
for it involved the power of a state to deprive an individual of a vested property
right in the alleged exercise of its police power.
The controversy grew out of surface subsidence due to the ordinary mining
of coal. Pennsylvania enacted the Kohler Act which made it unlawful "so to conduct the operation of mining anthracite coal as to cause the caving-in" of buildings
erected on the surface even though the right of surface support explicitly had been
waived. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in a very able opinion by the then
Chief Justice Von Moschzisker, sustained the act, adopting the general principle
that the individual's rights are subordinate to the welfare of the group, or as
expressed in constitutional language that contractual property rights are subject
to the reserved right of the state to modify them by legitimate assertion of the
police power. 4
Mr. Justice Kephart discerned the dividing line between a legitimate use of
the police power for the welfare of the group and "a confiscatory enactment under
the guise of a police provision"; and with splendid courage filed a vigorous and
to the Supreme Court of the United States a conclusive argument in support of his
differentiation; for the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes follows the convincing
summary of Justice Kephart's argument with which his dissenting opinion closes.
1267 Pa. 86 (1920).
2258 U. S.92 (1922).
8260 U. S. 393 (1922).
4274 Pa. 489 (1922).
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May I suggest to the lawyers here present that the opinions of the Mahon case
be read in connection with the opinions in the old Sanderson cases,5 wherein the
rights of the individual were subordinated to the welfare of the group; and tell
all who sense an instant peril that Justice Kephart in his dissenting opinion in the
Mahon case admonishes against the possible use of the police power "to bring about
the condition so earnestly longed for by those advocating equalization of property."
Justice Kephart has been reversed only twice by an appellate court and this
can be said of few justices of equal years of service.
In County Commissioners' Petition,6 the Supreme Court declared void an
act because of a defective title, which the Superior Court had held gave sufficient
notice of the purpose of the act. 7 Commonwealth v. Disantos is the only case
in which the United States Supreme Court reversed Justice Kephart. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in an unanimous opinion written by Justice Kephart sustained the validity of a statute which in an effort to prevent the fraudulent selling
of steamship tickets penalized all selling without procuring a license. The Supreme
Court of the United States held, by a divided court, that the act was violative of
the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. Justices Stone and Holmes
concurred in a strong dissent by Mr. Justice Brandeis, wherein he uses the language
following, which is conclusive that the opinion of Mr. Justice Kephart is not
entirely devoid of reason: 9
"If Pennsylvania must submit to seeing its citizens defrauded, it is
not because Congress has so willed but because the Constitution so
commands. I cannot believe that it does."
Again his service is exceptional in that in only one case has an opinion of
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania written by Justice Kephart been subsequently
overruled by that Court.
Greene County v. Southern Surety Co.10 is a careful study of the law of Pennsyl.
vania relative to the rights of third party beneficiaries to recover on a contract.
After an exhaustive review of the cases the rule is evolved that a creditor beneficiary in the absence of privity of contract cannot recover but a donee beneficiary
may recover where there is either a consideration or there are unusual circumstances. While it must be admitted that this rule was against the great weight of
5
Particularly the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Paxson to the first appeal, 86 Pa. 401
(1878), published in the last appeal, 113 Pa. 126 (1886), pp. 156 to 162, See also second appeal
94 Pa. 302 (1880).
6255 Pa. 88 (1916).

761 Pa. Super. 591 (1915).
8285 Pa. 1 (1925).

9273 U, S. 34 (1927).
10292 Pa. 304 (1928).
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authority, Massachusetts, Connecticut and Michigan being the only other states
then in accord with Pennsylvania, yet as Justice Kephart demonstrates, the prior
decisions of his court made obligatory the continuance of the rule so imbedded
in precedent.
Thus the law stood until the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Great
American Indemnity Company, 1 in an opinion which neither discussed nor
mentioned it, overruled the Greene County case; and this only because three
things had in the interim happened:
(a) Professor Arthur L. Corbin had written his illuminating "Selected Readings on the Law of Contracts," (b) the Restatement of the Law of Contracts had
adopted his view and (c) the Pennsylvania legislature, as Mr. Justice Kephart
pointed out in his concurring opinion, had "indicated that public policy favors
12
permitting recovery by the third party beneficiaries in such contracts."
In his concurring opinion in the Great American Indemnity Company case,
justice Kephart not only expresses regret at the delay in overruling the Greene
County case but points out that that case was originally decided because the Court
as then constituted was "bound by the doctrine of stare decisis and must await
legislative action*"
to come into accord with the more equitable, reasonable
and prevailing view."
The opinion of the then Judge Kephart in Ben Avon Borough v. Ohio
Valley Water Co. is certainly the most important decision which he wrote as a
member of the Superior Court, and is the source and justification of the highest
tribute that can be paid to him as a clear and original thinker. This case is out
of the ordinary because his opinion in the Superior Court' 3 reversed the finding
of the tribunal below, the Superior Court in turn was reversed by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania 14 and the Supreme Court of the United States15 in its
turn reversed the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and affirmed the opinion ot
Judge Kephart.
The assumption of jurisdiction which the Superior Court made in that decision
is without extended discussion of principle or citation of authorities but is ot
greatest moment in the protection of property by the courts against confiscation,
and will take its place as a barrier against the legislative delegation of judicial
functions to commissions not authorized under the Constitution.
The Public Service Commission of Pennsylvania had made a rate order and
the Water Company against which it was rendered contended on appeal that it
11312 Pa. 183 (1933).
12Act of June 23, 1931, P. L. 1181.
1868 Pa. Super. 561 (1917).
14260 Pa. 289 (1918).
15253 U. S. 287 (1920).
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was confiscatory. The Commission maintained the reasonableness of the rate
and asserted that its rate was final and could not be revised on appeal to the courts.
Judge Kephart denied the conclusiveness of the established rate, held it was confiscatory and laid down the first fundamental rules that should govern the determination of the fixing of public utility rates.
The Supreme Court in an opinion by Mr. Justice Potter, reversed the Superior
Court and in effect held that a court could not substitute its opinion of a reasonable rate for the order of the Commission and also sustained the Commission's
contention that the legislature could delegate to a commission not only a legislative but likewise a judicial function which was final and conclusive against any
review by the courts established under the Constitution. It was this great fundamental question which later was argued with exceptional ability by William Watson Smith and George B. Gordon, in support of Judge Kephart's decision. That
case was so important in the great issue involved that it is one of the rare cases
wherein the Supreme Court of the United States ordered a reargument; which
finally in reversal of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and affirmance of the
decision of the Superior Court held the rate was properly condemned by Judge
Kephart as confiscatory and that the legislature of Pennsylvania under the Constitution of the United States could not deprive a citizen of his right to have that
question determined by the' courts of the land.
Thus after only a few years on the bench, Judge Kephart established in Pennsylvania the rule of fair present value in contradistinction to replacement value,
formulated for general legal acceptance the several elements that determine that
value and vindicated for the Nation a fundamental right of individual property,
the invasion of which gave to the courts of England so great concern as to cause
its Lord Chief Justice Hewart to write his book16 in admonitibn against parliamentary usurpation by delegation of a judicial function to its bureaucratic agencies;
and against which the Supreme Court of the United States, as today constituted,
stands steadfast.
About the time Justice Kephart became a Judge the liberal principle of group
concern for the individual was enacted into law by the Workmen's Compensation
Act. As a member of the Supreme Court Justice Kephart has written several im7
portant opinions, every one of which construed the acts, both State and Federal,'
as intended by their framers, to advance the social and economic welfare of the
worker. Qualp v. James Stewart Co."' places a liberal construction upon the
statutory word "contractor" and allows the employee of a sub-contractor to recover from the principal contractor. Gallivan v. Wark'9 determines that the
16"The New Despotdin."
l7McCully v. Monongahela Ry. Co., 289 Pa. 393 (1927).

18266 Pa. 502 (1920).
10288 Pa.443 (1927).
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statutory right to compensation does not deprive the injured employee of the
common law right to sue the third party tort-feasor.
His contributions to substantive law can but inadequately be referred to here.
In torts it was his opinion in Burke v. Hollinger,20 which was later amplified in
Ladner v. Siegel,2 1 that first classified the types of residential and commercial districts in a city so that some definite basis might be formulated to determine when
a public garage is a nuisance.
Doinabyl22 is exhaustive and thorough in setting
His decision in Gaydos v,.
forth the law relating to the recovery of damages in wrongful death cases. In
this decision he not only sets forth the parties entitled to damages but clarifies
the method of computing the pecuniary loss with such simplicity of statement as to
make it a standard for use by lower court judges in jury instructions.
In defining the rights of riparian owners,2 3 of pedestrians, 24 the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur,2 5 and the duties of a master, 26 he has settled doubt by the clear
statement of a plain principle.
The contributions of Chief Justice Kephart to equity and constitutional law
are not of the ordinary. His equity opinions far outnumber his opinions in any
other branch of jurisprudence. Time will permit reference to his discussion of
only two branches of this all-inclusive subject.
The use of injunctions in labor disputes is not pleasing to this liberal-minded
Justice. While he concurred in the injunction issued in Kraemer Hosiery Co. v.
IfVorkers, 2 7 because the workers were guilty of violence, he questioned the propriety of the broad terms of the injunction and suggested that the injunction should
be modified "so as to restrain* *** (the workers), from committing any of the acts"
which he had described as "being unlawful." In Kirmse v. Adler28 he vindicates
the workers' "unquestioned rightt to present their case to the public in aewspapers
or circulars in a peaceful way," and also "picketing, if peaceful and unaccompanied
by coercion, duress, or intimidation."
In the administration of trust estates the question of apportionment of extraordinary dividends in the form of stock dividends or rights to subscribe, between the life-tenant and remaindermen, has been a source of perplexity to the
courts of equity of the different states. Two rules have been formulated, (a) the
rule of convenience which gives all income, in whatever form, to the life-tenant
20296 Pa. 510 (1929).
21296 Pa. 579 (1929).
22301 Pa. 523 (1930).
2
3Palmer Water Co. v. Lehighton Water Supply Co., 280 Pa. 492 (1924).
24Gilles v. Leas, 282 Pa. 318 (1925).
25
Fitzpatrick
2

v. Penfield, 267 Pa. 564 (1920).
6Reilly v. Reilly, 264 Pa. 103 (1919).
27305 Pa. 206 (1931).
28311 Pa. 78 (1933).
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and (b) that of intact value which apportions the extraordinary dividends in
such way as to keep intact the value of the principal as of the date of the creation
of the trust.
Justice Kephart in Nirdlinger'sEstate," following the Pennsylvania principle
originally announced in Earp's Appeal,30 formulated a rule for the apportionment, which has become not only the fixed rule in Pennsylvania but has been adopted generally by other states. This rule with its modifications was exhaustively
expounded by the Chief Justice in Waterhouse's Estate,31 and probably is the
clearest statement of the law of apportionment of income of extraordinary dividends to be found in the books.
This formula of apportionment is now recognized throughout the country
as the Pennsylvania rule and became the subject of discussion at a meeting of the
American Institute of Law then engaged in considering the restatement of the
law of trusts. Such was the interest of Justice Kephart in defending the Pennsylvania rule against attack of its opponents that he was urged to attend that meeting and with great ability explained and with rare sagacity maintained its equitable operation. At the conclusion of his argument, on vote taken, the Pennsylvania rule was recommended and is now incorporated in the Restatement of the
Law of Trusts.
Reference has already been made to his contributions to constitutional law,
but this should be amplified in a short summary of his mental approach to all
legal subjects. He is firm and consistent in adherence to the doctrine that the
Federal government is one of delegated powers, with all rights and powers not
expressly granted reserved in the states and to the people of the states. He believes
that the police power "is the greatest and most powerful attribute of government"
and that if "the exercise of the police power should be in irreconcilable opposition
to a constitutional provision or right, the police power would prevail." This was
by him said in Commonwealth v. Widovich," wherein the Supreme Court of the
United States dismissed the appeal.' 3 He, however, realizes that "The United
States, being a government of limited powers, does not possess a general police
power,"' 4 stating that the United States government has "a special police power
****in aid of its delegated powers," and that the only power of Congress "to
fix such prices must come, if at all, from the war power and not from the police
power.
The Chief Justice here was in seeming accord with the Madison and not
the Hamiltonian construction of the welfare clause of the Federal Constitution.
29290 Pa. 457 (1927).
$428 Pa. 368 (1857).
31308 Pa. 422 (1932).
32295 Pa. 311 (1929).
83280 U. S. 518 (1929).

84Highland v. Russell C. & S. Plow Co., 288 Pa. 230 (1927).
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His opinion in sustaining the Talbot Act in relief of unemployment proceeds on the theory of a duty in contradistinction to a charity, and he held the
statute valid not as an exercise of the police power but in performance of the
duty to care for the poor under the explicit constitutional power to appropriate
funds for that particular purpose.35
The idea of law as a fixed inflexible rule is not his. His concept of the law
is of a vital organism which to the end and purpose of justice "adapts itself to changing conditions as marked by the progress of public, material and social affairs." 3 6
He believes that social progress "must and will break through any judicially established principle, as it must and will break through any law that impedes its
3
growth." ?
Although his conception of the law is that of a flux, always in a state, as
expressed by Justice Holmes, of "becoming"; yet he realizes the need of adherence to precedent in fulfillment of the need of certainty in the law. This is
well illustrated in the third party beneficiary rule as by him stated in the Greene
County case.
The righteous judge abhors the use of technical rules which will result in
injustice. One of the last of Justice Kephart's opinions, and certainly his most
argumentative and vigorous dissent, is in Beirne v. Continental-Equitable Title
and Trust Company,,38 wherein, more as an advocate than as a judge, he maintains that a husband should not be sustained in conveyance of his property in
admitted fraud of his wife. In this opinion he denounces the rule laid down by the
majority of the Court, under which "a husband may easily defeat the claim of
his wife after his death even to the extent of making her a pauper."
The highest tribute that can be given to Chief Justice Kephart is, that from
his earliest decision in Ben Avon Borough v. Ohio Valley Water Co. to the convincing logic of his Mahon dissent and the humanity of the Talbot Welfare opinion,
he has acted uniformly and consistently upon the conviction that the fundamental
judicial function is that basal problem of the ages-the reconciliation of society
with the individual, of man and his freedom with government and its power.
Liberty and order are in constant conflict; individualism and collectivism are contrasting governmental policies. The pendulum of political action swings constantly between the individual and the group.
Mine is the surmise, his is the conviction, that collectivism with its control
of all industrial life and attendant economic relations, with its extreme exercise
of police power for public health and with its enactment of laws for the individual's
SfCoymmonwealth ex rel. v. Liveright, 308 Pa. pp. 55-85 (1932). Concurring opinion by
Maxey, J., dissenting opinion by Simpson, J.,concurred in by Drew and Linn, JJ.
S8Nesbit v. Riesenman, 298 Pa. 475 (1930).
87Burke v. Hollinger, 296 Pa. 510 (1929).
88307 Pa. 570 (1932).
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moral and social good has passed far beyond the limits ever heretofore reached
by any government, in the assertion of its right to take from the individual his
liberty or his property either for his assumed good or the postulated welfare
of the public.
The pendulum is now swinging towards centralization in political action.
The Federal Government has taken to itself the powers of the several states and
the individual by both Federal and State legislation is submerged in what is
conceived to be the good of the group.
The next years will test to the full the mind and courage of our judiciary
and I make bold to state that so long as John WV.Kephart is Chief Justice of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania his will be the guiding principle that the welfare of the State can never be higher than the liberty of the individual, and this
because social welfare, collective contentment and national liberty are but the sum
total of the good, the happiness and the freedom of the individual.
And now a last word not in appraisal of your work, not in surmise of your
convictions, nor of hope, other than for your health and peace of mind-but
of certainty in the prophesy that when you, no longer a conscientious and courageous judge, shall have laid aside the honored mantle of Chief Justice of this
Commonwealth, it will be as unsullied and clean as when it first covered your
shoulders, and you will return to the bar and to the friends of your youth and
school days a loyal friend and a good man.
Philadelphia, Pa.

Ruby R. Vale

